

Fighting creditpush fraud

Preparing for Nacha's fraud monitoring rule changes





- Introduction
- The rise of credit-push fraud and impact on Nacha rules
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- Call to action
- Questions and resources


The rise of credit-push fraud and impact on Nacha rules

An explosion of credit-push fraud is here

- ACH fraud prevention has historically focused on unauthorized debits
- Criminals are shifting focus to exploit credit-push payments of all kinds

Key data from 2024 AFP survey






Source: 2024 AFP Payment Fraud and Control Survey.

Originators typically bear the loss of funds

Percentage of lost funds recovered (percentage distribution of organizations experiencing payments fraud)



43% of organizations recover less than 25% of original payment value


Transactions were an *authorized* credit push

Businesses and consumers take losses in majority of cases

Impacts all payment rails

Source: 2024 AFP Payment Fraud and Control Survey.

A layered approach helps reduce credit-push fraud



Fraud monitoring amendments for originators

Originator, TPSP, TPS, ODFI and RDFI amendment requirements



Originators, TPSPs, TPSs and ODFIs establish and implement risk-based processes to identify ACH Entries initiated under false pretenses



RDFIs establish and implement risk-based processes to identify ACH Credit Entries suspected of being unauthorized or authorized under false pretenses



An annual review of established processes to make updates as risks evolve

The Fraud Monitoring amendments are part of a comprehensive approach to reduce fraud risks in the ACH network and to improve the chances of recovery when fraud has occurred.

Fraud monitoring amendments will be implemented over two phases

Phase One: Effective March 20, 2026

Applies to all originators, third-party senders, and third-party service providers that originated more than 6 million ACH transactions in 2023

 Also applies to all banks that received over 10 million ACH transactions in 2023

Phase Two: Effective June 22, 2026

- Applies to all originators, third party senders, and third-party service providers that did not meet the threshold for Phase One
- As well as all banks that receive ACH transactions that did not meet the threshold for Phase One

Navigating potential fraud with ACH origination payments

Identifying false pretense attempts is critical in protecting your organization

CEO impersonation

Fraudster impersonates person of authority to demand authorization of ACH origination

Vendor impersonation

Fraudster pretends to be a vendor that a company works with and requests payment to a fraudulent account

Real estate impersonation

Fraudster acts as a real estate settlement agent or attorney to have funds transferred to a fraudulent account

Employee impersonation

Fraudster claims to be an employee of an organizations and requests payment to a fraudulent account





Amendment for New Company Entry Descriptions

Effective March 20, 2026¹

The Company Entry Description (CED) is a 10-character field the originator uses for purpose of a payment.

The new rule establishes a standard description for the CED Field for specific types of transactions.

These changes are part of a comprehensive approach to reduce fraud risks in the ACH network.

PPD credits for the payment of wages, salaries, and similar compensation must use the value of PAYROLL in the Entry Description field for a batch containing those **Payroll** transactions. Originators should continue to use PENSION for retirement benefit payments. WEB debits for the online purchases of goods, including recurring purchases first authorized online must use the **Purchase** value of PURCHASE in the Entry Description field for a batch containing those transactions. Other Nacha HCCLAIMPMT specific RFVFRSAL **Company Entry** ACCTVERIFY **Descriptions** RFTRY PMT

1. March 20, 2026 is a "no later than" date, Originators may begin using the descriptions as soon as is practical for them.

Call to action

Use account validation and dual approvals

- Perform account validation for ALL new or changed receiver account numbers
 - Commercial account validation services
 - Micro Entry transactions (Requires additional business processes)
 - Prenotes do NOT establish account ownership
- Review account activity daily and report any suspicious transactions immediately
- Establish dual controls for ACH origination and account changes
- Make sure secondary approvers are taking the time to review carefully



Create and document payment request and change procedures

Document procedures to validate payment requests from customers, company personnel and partners to change payment instructions.

Use known contact information (not any of the information provided in a change notification).

Remind your staff that criminals often create a sense of urgency to pressure them to make a quick decision.



Establish a cadence of continual risk assessment



Conduct an annual risk assessment and remediate any items of concern



Adapt to evolving threats



Know your baseline of typical activity to help spot anomalies

This checklist does not constitute legal advice, nor is it exhaustive. You remain responsible for taking adequate measures to comply with the Nacha Rules.



Resources

Nacha Operating Rules - New Rules | Nacha

Nacha Resources for Treasury, Finance and Payroll Professionals | Nacha

"An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure".

Benjamin Franklin - 1736



Thank you

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